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THE NON-RATIONAL CHARACTER OF FAITH

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

LOTZE'S THEORY
OF
REALITY

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The Non-Rational Character of Faith

BY THE

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TO MY WIFE

PREFACE

THERE are signs that in the near future religion and reason will find themselves at variance as they have been in the past. Religion, during the closing years of the last century and the early years of the present one, has been at peace with reason, largely because she has set before herself the ideal of a reasonable faith, and has sought the justification of her basic principles at the hands of reason. But men are calling in question the high claims which reason has always put forward, and it seems as though reason is unable to justify them. Was religion right in relying upon reason, and is the validity of religion bound up with the validity of reason, so that if the latter is found wanting the former will also suffer lack? These are the questions I have raised in this volume.

My thanks are due to my teacher, Professor James Gibson, who has kindly read the work and commented upon it.

DOLFOR VICARAGE,
June 15th, 1925.

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	THE PROBLEM - - - - - -	1
II.	THE SOUL OF MAN - - - -	22
III.	THE NATURE OF TRUTH - - -	45
IV.	GOODNESS - - - - -	77
V.	BEAUTY - - - - - -	94

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

PHILOSOPHY has always played an important part in theological speculation. The doctrines and creeds which make up a very large part of the religious life, and which are considered by many as forming its first foundation, have always been intimately connected with philosophic speculations. Great theologians have also been great thinkers, and in building their systems they have used the stiff mortar of logical reasoning. Those who criticise religion from the point of view of life, and those who try to interpret life in terms of religious values, seek their methods in the armoury of scientific method and philosophic procedure. There have been times when religion has shown herself hostile to science, but realising that the foundations of science and the truth upon which it is based are unassailable, religion has thought it well to examine those foundations and to acknowledge that they are laid far more

deeply than she had suspected. Indeed, she is rapidly coming to the conclusion that if her point of view is to be valid over the whole range of life, then both science and herself must meet at a common starting point. Science, however, is nothing more than a carefully reasoned attitude towards life ; the methods she uses and the conceptions she finds for the conquest of nature and of mind are handed to her by reason, and consequently she has to appeal to reason in every advance she makes. Philosophy, whose task it is to investigate the nature of reason and to trace its workings throughout all the details of life, is thus placed in a pre-eminent position both as regards science and religion. Where men ask for a reasoned or a reasonable faith they are viewing religion as an activity of the spirit parallel with the intellectual pursuit of truth ; they must therefore find the approach to religion along the path of speculative enquiry and must look upon its truth or falsity as matters determined by principles of reason. The final appeal is to philosophy, for she tells us what reason is and how it works. She therefore claims the right, which she exercises in respect of science, of passing judgment upon religious conceptions and of setting up criteria by means of which the validity of religious forms

and doctrines can be determined. But are we right in bringing religion under the sway of reason? Is theology subordinate to philosophy and is a reasonable faith that after which religion ought to strive? Must all the varied forms of religion find their differences resolved in the light of pronouncements made by the philosophy of religion? I believe that religion ought to fix her eyes on a mark more distant than any which can be reached by reason; that her function is not in any way subordinate to, or even parallel with that of reason. If religion is to hold sway over the hearts of men and to guide them towards the destiny desired from the very depths of their souls, she must open out to men a realm of being beyond that where reason holds sway, and enable them to overcome death, who bids reason call a halt, and whose bidding reason dare not disobey.

It will not be out of place to consider for a moment how reason is able to bind together all the varied threads of life and to weave them into one harmonious pattern. Reason does not herself supply these threads; she finds them, each with its own particular colour, texture and strength, and she has to make the best use she can of what life thus places in her hands. Were we using the language of philosophic discourse we should speak

of the irrational elements lying at the basis of all that is and of all that happens, elements which reason has to connect together by forcing into their nature its own character, or by dissolving them and thereby holding them fast within its own principles. All the hard characteristics of material existence are entirely irrational—that life should find its basis in colours and sounds and hardnesses; that minds should be individual, each shut off from all the others, that they should each have a physical foundation in the nervous system of the body, and that they should gather knowledge and experience by ways of ideas and perceptions, are matters which have to be accepted as final and inexplicable. Science and philosophy take these irrational facts, and connecting them together by means of rational principles, are able to introduce reason into the very heart of irrationality and to unite together in systematic unity that which would otherwise fall asunder into mere unmeaning fragments. All the great sciences, such as those of chemistry, physics, biology and psychology, are built up in this way. Philosophers believe that it is possible to make religion systematic and meaningful in like manner. Religion, they say, is one among many spheres of human experience. Just as chemical phenomena and

biological phenomena are systematised and explained by the sciences of chemistry and biology, so religious phenomena are thought of as explicable by the science or philosophy of religion. This science, for so we may call it, describes what are religious experiences and what are not ; it explains how religious experiences are connected with psychological conditions, what part they play in the life of the individual and in the life of society, what their truth value consists in, and how their validity is to be determined. Spiritual life becomes merely an aspect of this life, and knowledge of the Divine Being one experience among others, all of which call for explanation. It is our contention that this science or philosophy of religion rests upon very insecure foundations, that reason does not play the important part in religion that she does in science. Reason may be, and no doubt is, that which enables a man to knit himself very closely to the world and to find himself at home there, but it is making claims quite beyond its powers to fulfil when it seeks to knit man to God and to bring God down to the level of man's intelligence.

The simplest definition we can give of religion is that it consists of a relation between man and God. The philosophers maintain that this rela-

tionship is established by man's movement towards God. It is, they say, man's nature active towards God, and in this activity creating and building up a system of devotion, worship and knowledge, that constitutes religion. They would not deny that God is also active in uniting Himself with man, but the initiative of movement to establish the union is due, they would maintain, to man seeking God. There are two grounds upon which this view is based. In the first place, to make God the mover would altogether destroy man's responsibility and at the same time it would make God accountable for those who do not find Him. No man, however sinful he may be, ought to be visited with a sinister fate for his failure to find God when it rests upon God to find him first. The weight of the relationship, if one may use such an expression, must thus be borne by man. In the second place, the nature and limitations of scientific analysis force the philosopher to regard the relationship between man and God altogether from the side of man. It is not possible by means of scientific method and philosophic procedure to take both terms in isolation and analyse them so as to discover what it is in them that makes the relationship possible. This can only be done with one of the terms, namely, man. The attempt to give

definite character to God and to analyse that character in detail always ends in attributing to God what we consider to be our own virtues. Such a procedure really consists in making God a finite existence among other finite existences. God thus becomes man and the relationship between Him and ourselves is conceived after the manner of that between man and man. The worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary is a revolt in some sense against just this attitude, and at the same time an illustration of it. Where systematic religion receives its guidance at the hands of the men-folk of the community the nature of God and the whole tone of religious life is often masculine in character; in consequence of this the need is felt of a feminine influence emanating from the Deity. "You make your Gods of the male sex and you hurl them at our heads Sunday after Sunday so that your religion is merely an aggrandisement of the male," . . was a cutting criticism that once rather put me to silence. But neither religion nor philosophy can accept a finite God. The finiteness of the Divine Being would destroy the ultimate character and value of those principles which, taking their rise in the relationship between God and man, constitute the basis of religious life and the justification of moral

endeavour. No one can feel that holiness and righteousness and duty have first claims upon him unless he can be sure that they are independent of the vicissitudes of time and rest in that which manifests itself as the eternal foundation of all that is. Since God is an infinite Spirit He must be beyond man's powers of comprehension. No scientific investigation of religious life can start with God because He is not open to the analysis and synthesis that make up the methods of science and philosophy. The only course that remains open is that of an analysis of man's nature in order to see if there are elements in it which make it possible for him to unite himself with an infinite God.

The first question that the philosopher of religion asks himself is whether these elements in man's nature are unique in kind. Does man possess some mysterious and miraculous powers which are indescribable and unanalysable in terms of the varied moments of his ordinary nature, but which nevertheless possess the power of knitting his life into the texture of God's life ? There are those who maintain that such powers are part of man's endowment. One man's life touches another's only at those points where both can establish a medium of contact ; courage, tender-

ness, patient care and kindly feeling are virtues, not of action only, but of intuition also, for without their aid no man would recognise their presence in those with whom he has to deal in the ordinary affairs of life. In the same way it is the divine in man that yearns for God, and only when the spirit that is of God is active in a man's life can that man reach towards God and eventually find Him. But the scientist and the philosopher will not have it so. From the nature of the case they cannot deal with these powers; they are concerned only with what finds its place in the texture of experience and is part of the warp and woof of that experience. The indescribable and the unanalysable are to them the unknowable and must be banished from the realm of scientific enquiry. They insist therefore that man relates himself to God through the medium of the same activities by means of which he relates himself to the world and to his fellow men. Truth, they hold, is all of a piece, a garment without seam, which no man may divide. Whether we will know nature or man or God it is the same path of knowledge we must tread. The powers of heart and mind that bring the world to our feet, that knit us in sympathy and service and duty to our fellows are those which, exercised it may be in a

different direction, yet put forth with a like energy and trustfulness, lead us also to God. For the scientist and the philosopher the religious life and the secular life cannot be the sundered things which others consider them to be, and man's mind does not need to be inactive towards the world in order to be active in relation to its God.

Behaviourists, New Psychologists and Psycho-analysts are throwing a great deal of light on aspects of mind that were hitherto very inadequately known. They are also bringing in new theories as to the nature and activities of mind. While they may eventually alter somewhat our views of mind, nevertheless at present they themselves have to carry on their investigations in the framework of older conceptions. That they will supersede these conceptions by others radically different is doubtful. What we must accept from them, however, is that mind has its roots firmly embedded in the functions of the body, and all its nourishment must pass upwards through these roots. But these functions of the body are not, as psycho-analysts assert, creative powers of mind, powers which transmute the crude material conveyed to them along the channels of primitive instincts into the fruit and flowers of a life laid down on principle and guided by high

moral endeavour. No mere primal instincts and no perversions or aberrations of these could bring to bear upon the material of sense, however much the gathering of that material may be due to these instincts, the interpretative power which reveals sense in the setting of a world bound down by law, moving towards ultimate ends and manifesting a beauty calling forth our appreciation by silencing all that is narrow or sordid in ourselves.

It is through the exercise of the activities of knowing, willing and imagining that man relates himself to the great realms of truth, goodness and beauty. These constitute his world, and all his efforts are directed to probing more deeply into it and finding himself more at home in it. The world, however, is one, and man's powers of mind relating him to that world are aspects of a unified activity. One aspect may at times predominate over the others, making it appear as though the mind were wholly engaged in knowledge or willing or imagination. But without knowledge will would be blind, and without imagination neither knowledge nor will could step out from the immediate present, feeling their way into the future, so that man could have some kind of preparation to meet what the world has to offer him. In the pages that follow it may happen that I shall

speak of man as relating himself to this world through the medium of knowledge. I do not mean to neglect the other aspects of mind, but rather as a matter of convenience to use the term knowledge as comprehending these. The object to which the mind relates itself, and the process through which this takes place, develop together in the mind of the knower. Not until the object has penetrated the mind or arisen as an undeveloped content in mind can the knowing process act in reference to it. And if as a result of this activity the object does not reveal itself more and more for what it is, the knowing process comes to a standstill. The process of knowing and the development of the object in knowledge are moments in one activity. Thus we see the world of objects shaping man's life, giving it the concrete fulness and the material out of which it can create for itself the content of consciousness. Without this content it would wither into a mere animal body driven by dimly conscious instincts, never possessing itself and never being anything to which worth or value could be assigned.

But although the world of objects thus penetrates into man's mind, exercising within it and in conjunction with the mind's own powers a creative power that gives to it fulness of being, nevertheless

the character and existence of this world are dependent upon the very mind which it helps to create. The world to which we have to relate ourselves, although it manifests itself as a hard and fast existence, is nevertheless the world as it appears in knowledge and is penetrated through and through with the character and possibilities of development that man's point of view predicate of it. Even existence is not something in its own right apart from man's needs and purpose and outlook. That which exists is that to which one mind can guide other minds; it is that which enables minds to transcend their exclusiveness and open as one in the presence of an identical content. Where minds lack this power of transcendence in reference to what they see and hear, there the character of existence is lacking. However real one's dream figures may appear or however vivid the creatures of one's imagination may be, they are not existences. We may describe our dreams and imaginations so that others may repicture them, but we cannot make them, by such description, the common property of both ourselves and our neighbours. No feet but mine have ever trod the landscape of my dreams, no eyes but mine have ever seen or ever will see the flitting faces that my imagination conjures up when I people

the past or the future with the creatures of my fancy. It is not that all this richness, forming, as some would say, a realm of etherealised beings, is not real; its reality is as firm and assured as ever any reality could be, for every colour, every sound, every face and every voice takes its place there only by permission of laws and conditions that are as hard and fast as the most rigid that ever science formulated; and this is the essence of what we mean by reality. But these beings from that other realm, pouring out their treasures to each man singly, bid him to whom they give them hold them to himself alone. They will not allow him to bring his social powers to bear upon them nor will they allow themselves to be heaped up for the common weal or woe. And because man cannot relate them, although they are his possessions, to just these purposes, he is forced to deny them the character of existence. Thus man does not stand related to his world as two objects stand related to one another. Man's powers move at the very centre of all that is. While it may be true that man is dependent upon the world it is no less true that the world is also dependent upon man; without the connecting and creative principles with which his spirit, realising itself through the harmonious and warring

activities of many minds, binds together the detail that constitutes on the one hand the content of mind and on the other hand the qualitative characters of the material world, the whole of reality would unweave itself like a piece of webbing whose threads have become broken. The philosopher sees, if not the whole of man's powers still by far the greater part of it, directed to knowing, valuing and appreciating this objective world; he also sees this world made concrete, vast and full through the spirit which man recognises as his own working within it. No wonder that he regards the mind of man as the great master builder.

If man relates himself to God through the same activities by means of which he relates himself to the world then God must be revealed to the human mind when man turns his activities in the direction of inexhaustible knowing, unfathomed loving, and infinite appreciation. These activities open out to man the realm of the supernatural and reveal God as an infinite being, the high and holy One inhabiting eternity. The religious consciousness, however, sees God and the realm in which He dwells as being entirely independent of both man and the world. The world and man may be dependent upon God for God made the world

and gave to man the possibility of perfecting themselves so that they can become His children, but this dependence is entirely one-sided. Though the earth should pass away and though man should come to utter destruction nevertheless God would persist in this eternity of being.

It is here that a great chasm opens out between the philosopher and the man of religion. If the philosopher is consistent he will either deny that there is a realm of the supernatural cut away from earth and ruled over by an infinite God, or he will hold that this realm is created by man himself in the exercise of those powers which are creative of the world. It is doubtful, however, whether any philosopher would for a single instant maintain that man's creative powers can give being to an Infinite God and existence to an eternal realm cut away entirely from the things of time. He would be much more likely to insist that God is a finite mind, higher perhaps than man's mind but nevertheless taking shape and character from His intercourse with man. The realm in which such a finite God exists would not merely be dependent upon God's own powers in relation to it, but would owe much of its being and character to the minds of men, who by communing with God, give to Him fulness and directive

powers of soul. On such a view as this the destruction of man would mean the destruction of God, for each sustains the other in that community of souls through which all that is or ever can be springs into being. It is much more usual, however, for the philosopher, while perhaps not altogether denying the existence of God, to refuse belief in a supernatural world cut off from this world and serving as the habitation of an infinite God and the abode of spirits. Because this supernatural realm is very indefinite and vague in outline, very empty and colourless in what we may call qualitative character, very shadowy and problematic as compared with the world in which we live, the philosopher argues that the spirit of man, when turned in this direction, has not revealed a true world of objective reality, the foundations of which are sure and its content abiding, but has merely over-reached itself. There is also a deeper consideration which influences the philosopher in his denial of the supernatural. Scientific method and philosophic procedure cannot admit an ultimate dualism such as that which is supposed to exist between this life and the world to come. A dualism of this kind would beckon knowledge over the chasm and at the same time would deny to it the possibility of

ever bridging that chasm. But where men can go there knowledge must also go, for if knowledge goes not there then man loses that which makes him man. To say that man when he crosses that border sheds all that makes him man in order to become spirit, is to the philosopher unmeaning. He insists that man's life as it partakes in both worlds, if two worlds there be, is all of a piece, else man will not recognise himself in the spirit world as he who was also in the natural world. The philosopher therefore must either connect the supernatural with the natural along the lines that man's knowledge dictates, in which case the supernatural becomes the natural, or in denying knowledge of the supernatural he must altogether deny its existence.

There is one great fact, however, which denies all the logic of the philosopher. The world and life may be a vast unity but nevertheless death marks the limits of that unity. Neither life nor the world can put their feet across the threshold where that dark messenger keeps house. Knowledge, will, appreciation, desire, and the ends and purposes for which men strive come to a sudden stop, and no impulses from life can put them once more in motion when once the halt has been called. In man's desire for immortality lies the

assurance that there is something in man which time cannot satisfy and which refuses to bind itself to earth, something which seeks a realm beyond and in the unknown where things are vastly different from what they are here and now. I am quite well aware that there are philosophers who, on the basis of philosophic speculation, grant a justification for man's belief in immortality, but I would point out that such immortality always seems to be very different from that which would satisfy the saint. The immortality of philosophy is always a return, not perhaps by the way of individuality, but by way of a perfection which life and the world grant, to the sphere where the things of time hold sway and the issues of life are resolved in life itself. But the saint seeks his eternal rest at the hands of God and finds it in that realm where time has passed away and life is the memory of a dream long passed.

It seems as though the philosopher, by denying the validity of what we have provisionally called the supernatural, has denied the truth of religion. This, however, would not be altogether true. What he does is to give to religion a different meaning from that given to it by those who postulate the existence of the supernatural. He maintains that if man will exercise his powers to their

full extent in building up his world, and if he will balance these powers and use them with patience and insight, then they will lead him to the realisation of a deep spirituality abiding in the world. The recognition of this spirituality inherent in the world is the essence of religion, and man's activity in relation to it constitutes the religious life. Those who accept this point of view find God as the whole of reality or as the perfection of the Good, the True and the Beautiful in their eternal unity, or as the conserver of the ultimate values that reality reveals as belonging to it. They maintain that God so conceived can call forth devotion and worship in a far higher sense than can the God who is merely supernatural. The poets have also come to their aid here, and much of modern poetry, where it is religious, conceives of God after this manner.

I believe this conception to be fundamentally wrong. God and the world are diametrically opposed; the spirit of man is not the mind of man developed somewhat further than is perhaps usually the case; our religious hopes do not turn upon a deeper understanding of the world and a more resigned submission to its course; rather do they turn upon the possibility of cutting ourselves altogether aloof from it and finding ourselves

in a depth of life where the principles that rule in this world are entirely done away with. It is not enough, however, to oppose this point of view to the philosophic-religious point of view. We must show that the world as built up by philosophic speculation does not contain anything in the nature of ultimate values, that it is through and through contingent and relative, and that in no way can it give satisfaction to man's desire for the abiding presence of God and the eternal stability of his own soul. If this argument can be sustained then it will at least leave open the other alternative that we have described. It will also have shown that the claims of philosophy to approach religion from the point of view of scientific method and to be able to build up a philosophy of religion that shall be the religion of the enlightened, are without foundation.

CHAPTER II

THE SOUL OF MAN

IT was because of religious needs, those vague desires and purposeless yearnings, intimating to man that he is infinitely greater than his surroundings, that man fashioned for himself the idea of the soul. Nevertheless the existence of the soul cannot be taken as the guarantee that man holds it as his own ; this soul of his contrives to hide itself deep down in the recesses of his nature, and whenever he sets out to find it, betakes itself still further into the depths.

Two ways present themselves by means of which man seeks possession of his soul, the one the way of knowledge, the other the way of religion. It is through knowledge of nature that man has been able to use the powers of nature for his own purposes and to shape the world in such a way as to realise the ends which he thinks fit. It is through knowledge of his own ideas, imaginations, desires and wishes that man is able to control his

own life, building up for himself a fulness of character in which he hopes to find himself. Imaginations and wishes, however, exercising their influence, not from a position just below the surface of consciousness, where memory and knowledge can always probe, but from the depths of mind which memory fails to sound, render a man dependent upon that which, while in a certain sense belonging to himself, is yet beyond him. Such hidden springs of action and intuition often play havoc with a man's mind and self-hood, and in all cases they introduce a feeling of conflict into the self as soon as it seeks to establish its own identity with itself. Man feels therefore that if all activities and purposes are to proceed from that with which he can fully identify himself and which he can call his soul, then he must bring to the light of day, through the medium of knowledge, that which lies concealed within his own being.

There are those, however, who insist that the path of knowledge is not the only way to self-realisation and self-possession. Want of opportunity for knowledge and lack of power to gain it are the lot of the majority of mankind. It is not that they sell their birthright, but that if this is the only way in which they can enter into it,

then it is for ever denied them. Fate may be a sinister fairy holding out to man her treasures with one hand and snatching them away with the other, but man always considers that he can circumvent her, getting from other sources the gifts which she makes dependent upon her whims. Should circumstances and lack of endowment withhold knowledge and the power which knowledge gives, nevertheless religion steps in to offer all, and more than all this lack denies ; she promises to the meek that they shall inherit the earth and to the saints that they shall judge the world. The world does not regard these promises as idle for it is justly impatient with those whose duty it is to give religious guidance, when that guidance fails to impart to men a quiet control over life and a trustful confidence in each other. Philosophy finds the soul as that which lives in and draws its sustenance from man's varied relationships to the world. It is forced to seek the soul here, for there is no other realm into which it is capable of entering in order to conduct its investigations. Religion, however, takes a somewhat different view. It finds the soul as living in those relationships which man is able to establish between himself and God. The question that naturally arises is whether the soul, in spite of

these differing relationships, is ultimately the same for both religion and philosophy. Some systems of pluralism start with a decidedly religious conception of souls ; they consider them as ultimate, eternal and uncreated. But the pluralist has to give a philosophic justification for the foundation upon which he builds. This justification must consist in showing how the whole world of existence, with all its varied details and laws and unity, proceeds from, or is explicable in reference to the natures and activities of these souls. Thus whatever may be the eternal character and destiny of souls their whole function, as far as philosophic speculation conceives it, turns upon their activities in relation to the world in which we live. As soon as their activities cease in reference to this world, then scientific method and philosophic speculation cannot sustain their interest in them. There may be religious meditation concerning them, but that is an entirely different matter. Even if philosophy should recognise that the soul, say of St. Augustine, is self-initiated, self-moved, eternal, nevertheless it could only deal with the activity of that soul in so far as that activity moved within the texture of the actual world. It could not concern itself with what St. Augustine now is and now does,

because his being and activity are not elements within the world with which its method is alone competent to deal. The religious enthusiast may pray for the repose of the soul of St. Augustine, but the philosopher as philosopher certainly would not do so. The philosopher, however, may seek to turn this objection by insisting that when he describes the soul as ultimate, eternal and uncreated, he is predicating of it conceptions which are philosophical in character and which have their own precise and determinate philosophical meaning. Religion, he may say, in using such terms, is forced to borrow them from the armoury of philosophical discussion ; philosophy, therefore, has to supply the basis both for the religious and philosophic conceptions of the soul so that she remains the final judge of the validity and value of religious principles. But this contention cannot be altogether justified, for although religion and philosophy may use the same terms they do not mean the same thing by them. Eternity for the philosopher may stand for validity or value which time cannot in any way affect ; logical principles and moral obligations and artistic appreciation are conceived of as possessing this aspect of eternity ; or again, it may mean the non-temporal which in some way

or another is the guide of temporal movement and perhaps constitutes its ultimate meaning; in this sense every temporal existence and event possesses an aspect of eternity. For the religious devotee, however, eternity means a form of being which carries itself beyond the temporal course of events here and now and persists in spite of the destruction which death brings upon our bodily existence. Death annihilates existence as we know it; it renders the validities and values with which we as existences are concerned, of non-effect, and it finally destroys the non-temporal guidance of the temporal events that constitute our life. Thus death sweeps away not merely the temporal, but also the philosopher's eternal along with it. Religion demands a form of being which continues in spite of this sweeping destruction. On this matter philosophy is silent and must remain silent. Many religious writers and teachers use these philosophical conceptions with a wilful disregard of their difference in meaning when taken in a religious sense. This is especially the case when dealing with eternity; men continually speak religiously of the eternity of the soul when they mean by this its eternal value from a philosophical point of view. To be guilty of confusion in this important matter is to build a religious

edifice with slack mortar and to risk its crumbling at the first touch of serious criticism. But let us compare the soul which is active in the world, and with which philosophy deals, with the soul as dealt with by religion. We shall find that the former is penetrated through and through with contingency, is relative to that which has no abiding significance, and possesses no ultimate character which can serve as the basis of religious activity.

Philosophy and scientific method equate the soul with the individual mind. It is only through the nature of mind that scientific method can approach the soul in order to examine its nature and to trace its functions. Furthermore, scientific method can only approach mind through the external world of objective existence. In so far as that which makes up the content of mind is subject matter of investigation it consists of qualitative constituents, which are also the basis of objective existence. Colours, sounds, smells, pressure, temperature and so forth, while they are the qualitative content of the things which I see in the outside world are also the media through which I perceive what the outside world really is. In being recognised as belonging to objects they penetrate or are possessed by mind

and form the perceptive basis of the mind itself from which its further activity can proceed. Consequently if there were no objective existence there would be no minds claiming recognition. If we want to know what minds are we must first ask what objects are. Not until I see, or have seen, felt, tasted, touched something, can I have knowledge, desire, will, or imagination; and it is around what I have perceived in this way that my knowledge, desire and imagination move, at all events, in the first instance.

The fact that the mind has its roots in the material world raises the question as to whether or not it partakes of the character and destiny of material existence. There are three alternative views. According to the first, the starting point and the basic constituents of all existence are those qualitative characters revealed in perception as colours, sounds, shapes and so on. Matter or material existences consist of nothing more than specific organisations or manipulations of just these qualities. Minds are manipulations of qualitative content just as things are manipulations of such content. There is a physical constitution of matter, a chemical constitution, and a biological; and in the same way there may be a mental constitution of matter which breaks out

into individual minds. Qualitative contents in so far as they are physical, are organised or formed according to mass differentiations ; in so far as they are chemical they are synthesised on the basis of chemical properties and chemical activities ; in so far as they are biological, they are ruled by principles of life. When we come to what we call the level of mind we arrive at an organisation of qualitative contents on the basis of interests, purposes, and so on. There may be and there must be differences in level, in degree and kind between the manipulation content undergoes to form things with definite modes of functioning and the manipulation which it undergoes to form minds with their particular ways of activity. But these differences, it may be said, are and remain material differences. However far removed in degree, in complexity, in elasticity mental manipulation or organisation of content may be from mass manipulation or organisation, the width of difference between them does not give to mental organisations a form of being which carries them into a spiritual realm over and above the material realm. Furthermore, the higher organisation of qualitative content constituting mind is not possible unless the lower organisation which we call material existence is also present.

A man standing on the bank of the river will see the water flowing, the green trees, the distant hills; he will feel the cold wind and wrap his coat around him to keep himself warm. The qualitative content of the material world around him is thus organised in his perception on the basis of his own interests and purposes. He himself, or his mind in its fulness and concreteness, is constituted for the time being by what he sees and hears in so far as all this remains under the controlling power of his interests and purposes. But this power of organising qualitative content on the basis of interests and purposes is only possible if it is preceded by a simpler organisation. There must be present a living body with its various organs all related, all functioning in varied interactions one with another and with immediate surroundings. If the man falls into the water and fails to get out, then his perception ceases. The harmony of colours, the medley of sounds, the unity of feelings all disappear. Their disappearance is due to the fact that the simpler organisations of content constituting bodily existence, which were connected with and which rendered possible the more complex mental differentiations of qualitative content, have been upset in the man's death by drowning. Thus on

this view the fate of mind is dependent upon the movements of material existence.

On the second alternative qualitative content reveals itself in mind and in mind alone. It is in the sight of the eye that sights live, in the hearing of the ears that sounds take form, in the feeling of the hands that existences shape themselves, because mind comes first and all that faces it as objective existence is really dependent upon it. Every manipulation of content must therefore be considered as due to mind. Mind is thus in no sense dependent upon a lower form of material organisation; on the contrary, it is mind itself that is responsible for the organisation of qualitative content according to mass differentiations; it is mind which gives us the world of physical objects; which makes the world a whole of qualitatively interacting elements; which enables us to see life as an ordered and moving system. How these different forms of organisation and the particulars of their incidence have their source in mind is not a matter which we need consider at this point. All we need to insist upon here is that the various principles through which qualitative content is organised into material existence and into living forms, take their character from mind. But mind as thus under-

stood is not to be identified with the mind of individuals. Individual minds are as much under the dominion and rule of mind as are the veriest of material things; and a divine mind would be no exception. Individual minds and individual things are all on the same level in being bound down by principles emanating from a single source. These principles may require, according as circumstances and conditions call for them, the dissolving of one mass differentiation into other mass differentiations, the resolving of one chemical substance into other chemical substances, the passing away of this or that generation of individual lives to make room for other generations. The abiding existence, eternal validity, and infinite value of the principles by means of which mind rules things, living beings and individual minds, does not in any way prevent the passing away either of things or of minds. Thus minds and things share a common fate, minds having no privileged position over and above that accorded to material things.

A third alternative is that minds break loose from the material conditions in which they find themselves and develop a being and value of their own which is ultimate and supreme. That which thus develops is consciousness, or in its higher

stages, self-consciousness. It is an exceedingly difficult matter to define consciousness. It is generally supposed that we ourselves are conscious, whereas things are not conscious. But consciousness is not a qualitative character added to others making up the being of an existing entity. We cannot say that the book is square, red, and so on, but does not possess the quality of being aware of itself, whereas I am a body related to things in a multitude of ways and also possessing this added quality of being aware of myself and of my relations to things. Qualities are rendered determinate by being related one to another in various ways and under various circumstances. This relatedness, however, which gives to qualities their specific characteristics, is only possible in the medium of consciousness. This latter envelops them all and by so doing allows them to be kept together so that they can reveal their qualitative contents through the play of varied harmonies and contrasts. Were consciousness a quality it would require a further and higher consciousness, which is not a quality, to relate it to the other qualities making up the being of the self. Nor again can we describe consciousness as a function or activity of something, because there is nothing of which it can be an activity. We cannot say

that it is a function of the body or of the brain, for both body and brain are objects of consciousness and not the source of consciousness. To say that it is an activity of mind is to presuppose mind as an existing entity, merely in order to predicate consciousness of it.

The most satisfactory way of understanding the nature of consciousness is to compare and contrast it with the unconscious and to find out its relations to this latter. We must not identify the unconscious with non-consciousness. That which is non-conscious is something about which nothing can be known and is therefore indistinguishable from nothingness. But the unconscious has definite characteristics and is perhaps the basis of the conscious. It reveals itself in sleep, in states of mind between sleeping and waking and in states of intoxication, as a dim awareness surrounding our clear perception and clear thought processes. And yet there is a deeper contrast that goes more to the root of the matter than this between clear consciousness and these states of unconsciousness. This is evidenced by the fact that unconscious states are sometimes called sub-consciousness, in distinction from an unconsciousness that is far more vital.

At however high a level we may live, however

wide our outlook and deep our knowledge, or however much we may immerse ourselves in affairs so as to give to our lives a certain fulness and concreteness, nevertheless we are always conscious that what comes to the surface of our lives or what we hold in consciousness is but a very small eddy on the surface of a much deeper undercurrent. In this deeper stream, which never becomes a stream of consciousness, lies the initiative, the directing forces and probably the deeper motives of our lives. This unconscious is not the confused and vague outer boundary surrounding our clear perceptions, nor is it the storehouse which we call memory, nor again is it the unanalysed and half-hidden motives of our varied activities. It is rather a deep seated and powerful force, driving consciousness before it and supplying the fundamental motivation of conscious activity and the direction which consciousness shall take in interpreting and arranging its experience to form a coherent whole. The difference between a Napoleon endowed with restless energy, seeking outlets for that energy in vast schemes of political organisation and war, and an ordinary individual content to live his life in quiet surroundings and easy circumstances is not a difference which lies within the orbit of consciousness. It is much

more a difference of fundamental mental endowment due to the tremendous force with which the unconscious drives consciousness along in the one life and the sluggish way in which the unconscious moves in the other.

The great problems for those who accept this theory of the unconscious turn upon the way in which consciousness proceeds from the unconscious and the meaning of one in relation to the other. By some the unconsciousness is considered as a matter belonging to the individual, being whole, and one might almost say entitative, in the life of each person ; others hold that the unconscious is racial, if not perhaps wider than this ; on this latter view it is one great stream on whose surface, at various points, individual centres of consciousness arise, develop and eventually pass away. Whether the unconscious is individual or whether it is one great racial stream does not really matter to the present argument. The important point is that if the direction, interpretative power and motivation of conscious life lies in the unconscious, then this unconscious must be the final meaning of life and its ultimate goal. It may be objected, however, that we are confusing the beginnings of consciousness with its final consummation. It does not matter from what

source consciousness proceeds, this source is not the criterion of its value, nor does it set a limitation upon its nature and destiny. As soon as consciousness has emerged from the womb of the unconscious, it gathers to itself a nature which the unconscious cannot give it, and wends its way to a goal in which the unconscious has no part. The various individual consciousnesses bring to realisation a realm of spirituality possessing ultimate value, fulness of detailed content in which rest definiteness and variety of character, and an abiding being which is penetrated through and through by consciousness and which ensures to consciousness its ultimate reality. Truth is fashioned in and through the perceptual activities of minds moving together in relation to their common experience under the guidance of great ideals ; goodness and beauty are fashioned much in the same way. These it is that constitute the spiritual realm of objective reality which is of ultimate value and in which minds can find their true home and the fulfilment of their highest aspirations. Nevertheless, the objection I would urge is this :—The realm of objective reality constituted by goodness, truth and beauty is sustained by the multitude of individual souls. It is in the network of these souls that it is woven.

Undoubtedly it may possess a validity of its own that is independent of any particular soul or any number of particular souls; but its concrete fulness, its variety of detail, and its reality in being depend entirely upon the fact that it is sustained by the souls who have created it or who bring it to realisation. As conscious existences these souls do not possess an abiding being comparable to the abiding worth with which their world of truth and goodness is invested. Souls thus produce a world of objective reality, contemplate it, live in it, and sustain it in being so long as they themselves are in being. But these souls pass away or subside into the unconscious, making room for other souls to whom they relegate the task of creating and sustaining the world. Thus the abiding value and the eternal validity of the world of goodness and truth cannot give eternity of being to the individual soul nor to any multiplicity of individual souls. Their fate is the unconscious from which they spring and into which they subside. Undoubtedly there may be stoical souls who can acquiesce in such a destiny, maintaining that they are satisfied to have lived for a short time in contemplation of the eternal as it manifests itself in the texture of things temporal; but it is doubtful whether such

an attitude expresses what these stoically minded persons really long for ; it is at best but a counsel of despair.

Many men feel, however, that the destiny of individual souls does not matter so much beside the great importance of building up an objective world of goodness, truth and beauty ; that because goodness and truth reside in this order it will ultimately guarantee for souls that which is best for them and that they can safely trust the eternal powers of goodness that rule in the world. But are not such men basing their faith upon an illusion ? There cannot be an order of objective reality apart from the order of souls through the medium of which such reality is sustained in being. And who knows how or why the unconscious brings these souls into being or whether the unconscious may not one day cease to bring any conscious minds to its surface ? It is this terrible unconscious that rules at the heart of life ; it is a monster whose ways are unknown, whose character is unknowable and which sweeps us along willy nilly until we are finally swallowed up in it. The reality which we have builded, the goodness which we have trusted and the beauty in which our hearts have delighted are as much at its mercy as we ourselves.

I have tried to show that no philosophical theory of the soul can give to it religious significance. The question will be asked :—Can religion do any better ? Can it give to men assurance and hope when philosophy fails to do so ? For religion the soul is very different from what it is for philosophy. One may describe the soul with which philosophy has to deal as a consciousness made concrete and full and active by its relations to, its interplay and interactions with other souls and other objects that are presented to it. The soul with which religion has to deal is a form of mind created in man's communion with or relations to the Divine Being. It is not conscious mind, for it possesses no qualitative content in relation to which it is active in building up a body of objective experience. Nor again is it a vague, confused form of mind due, as some of our conscious states are, to a want of detail ; nor is it unconscious mind, for it is infinitely far removed from the unconscious ; it possesses a very great intensity and the value which man assigns to it, once he has become aware of its presence, is so great that the whole of his conscious life and all that it implies has little worth in comparison with it. Man's hope is, that when his conscious life will have ended, this life of the spirit will become a perfect

life lived in close communion with God and without any disturbing influences such as those which proceed from the content of a conscious life lived in communion with the world.

I am quite well aware that very awkward questions can be asked in reference to the view put forward. It will be asked what exactly is it in a man's life that can thus come into communion with God; along what channels is communion established, and through which of his activities namely, will, or desire, or emotion, is man able to make use of these channels? All these questions, however, presuppose the view we are combating. They can only be asked by one who already believes that man's mind or soul is an entitative existence which can relate itself to God as another existence of a like kind. This, however, is to make the soul of man what it obviously is not, an organised body of content or a systematic unity of definitely directed activities. The man who does not take an interest in religion feels that however much analysis may reveal his mind to be the unity of its experiences, he nevertheless possesses a deeper aspect of selfhood which can and does guide him through all his experiences and make him master of them. The spiritually minded man is able to go much

further than this. He possesses a depth of being which can throw aside the whole weight of his temporal life, which can move towards God, and which, trusting in Him, can find infinite satisfaction in the intensity of spiritual life that is so created. If it is impossible to analyse the moving power which makes a man master of his own conscious life, and so far it has proved impossible, why should it be thought possible to analyse the much deeper power that knits a man's life wholly to God? To seek to analyse it is to make a mere thing of it or to degrade it to being a series of movements within the texture of experience. The same criticism applies to the question raised concerning the nature of the activities whereby man is able to knit his life on to God's life. We may ask what is the nature of the activity whereby a man relates himself to this or that object or to this or that person. Such activity really consists of definitely directed movements taking concrete form as organising principles within the structure of the world which man builds and to which he adapts himself. But man's activity in relation to God is fundamentally different. God is not an object within the texture of experience, an object which man has to connect up with other objects in these or those particular ways or

according to these or those definite principles. Man cannot therefore ask himself what activities he shall use and what activities he shall dispense with in order to bring God into his life. All he can do is to throw himself directly in the Everlasting Arms, pouring his whole being into the life of God and leaving it at that.

Thus the mind of man is not the soul of man and his conscious life is not the highest life. With these philosophy deals, bringing its scientific method to bear upon them. But man's soul remains outside the orbit of philosophical enquiry and scientific method. They have nothing to say concerning it because its whole being and activity are directed Godward and into the infinite and eternal where the awful intensity of life refuses to be swept into the narrow circle of mere consciousness and the temporal limits of a mere world.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF TRUTH

BOTH philosophy and religion, each in its own unique way, make very large claims upon truth. Each is a quest in search of truth, each marks the extent of the progress by the garnered store it has accumulated, each measures its own significance by pointing to the foundations which its manipulation of truth has enabled it to lay down as the basis of a life that is both for time and eternity. There is perhaps a difference of attitude in each case towards the end which each strives to attain, and there is certainly a difference of method in arriving at that end. Philosophy seeks truth as that which satisfies man's craving for knowledge ; religion claims to reveal truth so that by means of this revelation man can attain to freedom. No doubt it is difficult to understand exactly what freedom, in the religious sense of the term, really is ; but it seems to imply a loosening and separation from the evil that is in the world and also the possession of one's own

soul as a life lived within the life of God. Religion thus makes truth a force guiding man away from the world and towards a destiny having its foundations in the eternal. Philosophy, on the other hand, sees truth as a vast objective realm towering in a kind of cold immensity above men and to which they must adapt themselves as best they can. Certainly, philosophy knows of a passion for truth which can be all absorbing, but it is the passion of the explorer who loses the zest of endeavour when once the goal of his travels has been reached.

Religion and philosophy travel along different roads in their questing and make use of very different aids along the way. No aspect of life or existence escapes the philosopher's scrutiny, no detail is allowed to slip through the meshes of his net, no threads are allowed to hang loose in the texture that reveals to him the pattern of truth. Methodical, careful, and painstaking must he be before all else, building only upon certainty and leaving his own wishes and desires entirely out of account. The road of religion is an inner way of spiritual activity and contemplation. Through watchings and guardings and discipline of the self, intense activities which need a vast amount of care, man can fashion for himself a state of soul

into which, in his moments of reposeful contemplation, the vision of truth can enter, flooding the whole self with its transcendent light.

Although there is this difference of attitude and method which men may take up towards truth, yet truth, the philosopher insists, is one and the same, and neither our attitude towards it, nor our method of finding it, can in any way alter it. If, as a matter of fact, philosophy and religion do not meet, nevertheless they ought to meet in the one truth which is the foundation of all that is and the basis of the universe itself. But neither in respect of the wealth of detail, the nature of that detail, nor yet as regards the larger picture which truth presents, are philosophy and religion agreed. The scientists are continually pouring the results of their investigations into the philosopher's lap ; the historians and the poets and the artists bring to him their visions and their principles and their ideals. They expect him to take these, to lose none and to knit all into the body of truth. In comparison with the coherent and all embracing system that results from the activity of the philosopher the truth of religion appears very thin. To many, religion as far as its truth content is concerned, seems but a series of guesses, brilliant sometimes, but in most cases

the work of amateurish thought and manifesting the inconsistencies and barrenness characteristic of all thought of this kind. Because of the certainty of its method, because of the objectivity of its attitude and because of the greatness of the results achieved, philosophy claims a foremost place in the race for truth. And she goes yet further; from the heights to which she ascends she surveys the landscape, describing to those below, its main features and judging their view by her own larger vision. She makes her own charts and whoever would steer his course in life with any degree of certainty, whether it be from the religious or from any other standpoint, must move along the lines marked out by her. Is it not the case that all the great religious controversies have been philosophical in character? Such controversies would never have sprung up had not philosophy given to men at the time new conceptions, new visions, new interpretations of life, which religion sought to make use of for the deepening of her own life. Is it not also the case that whenever religion has experienced a period of increased vitality, philosophy has supplied the new wine nourishing that vitality, from the vintage of her own gathering?

But I am not convinced that the exalted position

of philosophy in respect of truth gives her the right to pass judgment upon religion. Truth, as she conceives it, is a very relative affair and does not possess the importance she assigns to it ; the light shed by its beams extends but a little way over life, clearing a small space, just enough to enable us to hammer out the few tools necessary to win something of sustenance, something of pleasure, and something of happiness during our brief sojourn here. And in his moments of contemplation man dreams of great adventures, of fairy realms where the infinite spirit that is within him can roam at will ; from the rafters of his workshop he takes down the lantern, stepping out into the shadows of the night and hoping to find by the light he carries the grand highway to the land of his dreams. But he never finds it, for there is always at his feet only just the little space giving room enough, but no more, to pitch his tent and to proceed anew with the work that binds him to earth and sustains him in being as a creature of earth.

Let us, however, examine somewhat more closely the truth which philosophy reveals to us. She supposes that there is a world of existence and events lying outside of us. This seems such an obvious position to take up, one that forces itself

upon us whether we wish it or not, that it is almost impossible to start with any other. Simple as it is, however, it carries with it very large metaphysical implications and gives rise to problems of great difficulty. The most important of these problems concerns the relation between our knowledge and existence. We know that knowledge begins and increases and fades: it is a growth rooted in the soil of existence, deriving its sustenance therefrom, allowing itself to be uprooted with barely a mark to show the place where once it flourished. But there are those who will not have it that knowledge is a mere growth upon the surface of existence. Existence, they hold, lives in knowledge, is shaped and moulded by the creative activity which is the very life of knowledge, beaten and hammered out in the flame issuing from man's nostrils. We have not, however, to decide between these alternatives. We would ask rather what importance, on either of them, truth can have for man. Dare he trust himself wholly and entirely to it? Will he be doing justice to his own deepest being if he considers himself what truth pronounces him to be?

Let us suppose that the truth of existence resides in knowledge. It is through the active

community of minds, all working together in face of a reality greater than themselves, that knowledge arises ; it is only by being handed down as an inheritance from one generation to another that it continues to be the possession of men. More than one decadent civilisation has allowed the threads to be snapped, leaving it for future generations to spin them anew. And who knows but that one day man may be swept from off the face of the earth and all his knowledge perish with him ? Man may rule out chance when he marks out his course here in the world, but nevertheless it was chance that brought both him and his race into the world and possibly chance will have the last word before ushering him out of it. Man may feel that he owes his existence to the incidence of laws which are unbreakable, and to a combination of circumstances brought into play by those laws. He may insist that there is no possibility of chance breaking through these iron chains. But the fact that he is somewhat upon which laws can exert their power and around which circumstances can move, is a matter entirely beyond the range of law and outside the scope of circumstances. Philosophically and scientifically he can find no reason for the fact that he is what he is,—a self-conscious being, and that he is when he is, namely,

in the flux of events that he calls the present. From the point of view of religion he may say that his soul came from God and will one day return to God who gave it, but to describe his being in this way is to speak in a language unintelligible to reason. Races and nations have to some extent the same consciousness of a high destiny which circumstances cannot explain and which is beyond the reach of causes. If knowledge depends upon man's continuousness in being and the human mind's fluctuations in intelligence, it holds on to life by very slender threads, and it is certainly not by these that man can hope to bind himself to the Eternal.

It may be said, however, that knowledge is an ideal and its perfection is that of an ideal, a perfection unattainable and unrealisable. Thus while it may be that the truth held in knowledge never is until attained, truth itself possesses an abiding being of its own independently of the fact of its more or less adequate possession by man. But this being is not that of an ideal. Truth may be an ideal as far as man's powers are concerned, since it presents itself to him as that which is ever beyond him and which he must for ever strive to reach. This, however, is not due to any elusive character belonging to the nature of truth, but to

man's endeavour to make his mind circumvent the whole of reality, coupled with the fact that his powers are not, and never will be equal to the task. Truth is not a self-illumined splendour ; it possesses a fulness of detail derived from that of which it is the truth, so that its abiding character is imparted to it from the being of that around which it clings. Were the realm of existence swept out of being then truth would perish, because it would lose, in the passing away of existence, the wealth of detail, the fulness of character and the variety of essential nature, which alone give it embodiment and which it borrows from the realm of existence. This would seem to indicate that it is within existence itself that truth finds its abiding presence.

Philosophers have found great difficulty in giving an adequate and uniform definition of existence. Every attempt to determine what it is in and for itself, apart from what it is for the minds who happen to know it, ends in failure. For the scientist, existence is merely a series of mathematical formulæ giving expression to a vast system of relations holding between an infinity of forces each one of which is individualised in certain quite definite ways. A cursory glance at such a conception of existence shows that as some-

thing that is for itself it is already on the edge of nothingness. The forces with which mathematical formulæ deal are only to be understood in terms of man's life of sensation and are elements in that life itself; the mathematical formulæ, which give form to these forces, are the expression of man's calculating intelligence. In all probability the individualisation of the forces lying at the basis of existence is due to the varied and limited activities which the senses call into play when constructive in respect of existence. Into this we need not enter here. Enough has been said to shew that existence dissolves itself into something dependent upon minds and constituting a moment or aspect of the life of minds; its abiding character, apart from minds, turns out to be an illusion.

Although existence may be constituted out of elements or qualitative contents which come to realisation only as the contents of mind, nevertheless it is objective and over-individual, possessing a binding force which it exercises in relation to all minds. It presents itself therefore as that to which minds can relate themselves with the full assurance that they are in the presence of something greater than themselves. The fact that existence manifests itself only in minds does

not make existence a mere ingredient in individual minds and therefore dependent upon the whims of any, or even of all minds. Society, for instance, is only possible through the activities of individual minds, yet it is over-individual; it possesses a value of its own, and all individuals have to submit themselves to it. Existence possesses the same character in reference to the individual as society does. Although it is constituted by qualitative contents which belong to minds, and perhaps to minds alone, nevertheless these contents are not exclusive to any particular mind or minds, but open to all under definite circumstances. It is this openness which constitutes their objectivity and renders real the objects of which they are the qualities. Through the fact of their being thus open to all minds the community of minds is able to exercise united activity in respect of them, and to build them up into a single world to which every mind must adapt itself. If existence is what we have stated it to be, what do we mean by the truth of existence and what value can we attach to it? Existence, as we have seen, is a characteristic applied to qualitative content; it is applied to this content when it fulfils certain conditions. These conditions, however, are imposed by minds acting in community. Minds say

in effect "when qualitative content is such that several of us can together deal with the same content then that content is constitutive of existence." There are several ways of thus dealing with content, but every way of dealing with it is the outcome of an activity proceeding from and determined by the natures of the minds which relate themselves one to another, through the medium of the content in reference to which they are all active. For instance, the sense of touch, although seemingly belonging to the body is an activity of mind and reveals the characteristic of weight as belonging to things; the sense of sight reveals colour as belonging to them, and so on. Minds without the sense of sight, such as those belonging to deep sea fish, could never find a world of colour, and minds which have senses not possessed by human beings find a world possessing characteristics unknown to us. It is these conditions, which qualitative content are made to fulfil before they can be constitutive of existence, that make up the truth of existence. Furthermore, these conditions are the outcome of the natures which minds possess. The truth of existence is thus relative to minds, and its value is determined by its power of fulfilling the needs and being instrumental to the realisation of pur-

poses set by minds acting in community. I do not deny that this is a very high value, but it nevertheless reveals the truth of existence as being relative and ephemeral ; relative to the particular nature and needs of minds, dependent upon them for its very being, passing away for ever if by any chance minds should cease to exist, a consummation which is not outside the range of probability. Religion, seeking that into which the soul can sink itself for all eternity and from which an infinity of greatness can stream into it so as to give to it a perfection of being that is commensurate with the eternal years, cannot rest in a truth built up out of the soul's own mortal nature, dependent upon the soul's limited needs in time and subject to the decaying influences that eat up everything belonging to time.

We come now to the truth of events or the truth of history. This form of truth is receiving a very great deal of attention from philosophers and theologians as well as historians. By the appeal to history they understand, not merely a reference to historical facts which the methods of history either establish or refute, but an appeal to principles or directions of movement. These principles are supposed to guide events, making them meaningful in reference

to the world in which they take place; by taking on meaning events become, not merely facts that occur, but values, and in being values they exercise an influence beyond their mere factual occurrence. It is through being related to historical principles that facts come to possess meaning and to penetrate into what lies beyond their own being. Every event that occurs takes its place in the scheme of things and becomes constructive of reality in virtue of the adhesiveness of its value. But this value, while in a sense making up the very being of the occurrence, nevertheless does not belong by right to the occurrence as a bare fact that somehow takes place. On the contrary, the event is invested with value by something that is greater than itself. It is in virtue of their constructive power in relation to reality that events are true, and therefore that which gives them their truth, or that which guides them so that they become full of value and meaning, is the ultimate form of historical truth; or rather it is the truth of history. How do facts become invested with meaning and who or what is the investing power? Is this power itself independent, final, and of such a nature that we must accept it as that beyond which there is and can be nothing? Must we bow before it with

the humility called forth when we are in the presence of that which by its own inherent force moves the whole of reality? Is it, in short, the ultimate truth upon which rest the foundations of life itself?

All historical movement takes place within periods or epochs. The boundaries which mark these periods are not merely boundaries of time; we speak, for instance, of a history of France, and a history of England; a history of Europe and a history of China; a history of political movements and a history of social reform; a history of science and a history of religious doctrine. Events do not arrange themselves into these various historical groupings. All kinds of events take place side by side and one after another, with very complicated relationships subsisting between them. Physical, chemical and biological processes run together in the life of a person alongside all kinds of political, social and personal endeavours. The events making up these various processes are interconnected and influence each other in very subtle ways, but they do not separate themselves out into definite groups and in these groups form wholes which run along each on its own weight. There is no chemical group of events functioning as a single whole and connected by

external threads with a physical group and a biological group ; all these kinds of events are intertwined one with another to form one great stream of events. The same is true in the larger sphere which we know as the life of the times. Some events are loosely connected together, others more closely, but it is the influences proceeding from all events to all events that render the whole course possible. Thus it is clear that before we can trace any historical movement there must be, by means of classification, a limitation of the material or of the kind of events within which this historical movement is thought of as taking place. The principles of classification which, enable us to introduce lines of demarcation into the flux of events crowding in upon us, have their origin in the fact that we have different senses from which we look out upon the world. It is because our senses, in being different one from another, force us to act in different ways towards the events that appeal to them, that we classify these events in different groups. Each group corresponds in character to the definite form of activity which this or that of our senses prescribes. When we wish to carry, push, or weigh things we consider them from their physical aspect ; this is one form of manipulation dependent upon the use we can

make of our limbs and bodily strength. Other forms of manipulation, such as those of colour and of sound depend upon the organs of sight and of hearing. There may be, in the events themselves, definiteness and variety of character which enables them to attach themselves to these different senses ; but were the different senses not there, or the differentiation between them not clear and definite, then these differences in the character of events, enabling us to classify them into groups each having its own distinctive character, would not make their appearance. It is the senses that put into our hands the first principles of meaning and value. An event has meaning in so far as it appeals definitely and clearly to this or that of our senses ; it has value in so far as it adapts itself so as to meet the requirements which our activity, moving through the senses, makes upon it. Thus we ourselves give to occurrences their first meanings and assign to them their primary values. It is not until events flow towards us, meet us and pass through the meshes of our nature, that they take definite direction and become in any sense guided. Each event may have its own quality and its own nature, but quality waits to be moulded, and essential nature asks for shaping at the hands of man before

they can fit themselves to become elements in the scheme of things and fragments in the course of time.

Events, however, ask for a greater and more adequate guidance than that given to them by the senses. Even if they come to us by way of the senses, grouping themselves together in accordance with the companionship they have kept while proceeding along the same roads, nevertheless they move towards larger issues and band themselves together in virtue of firmer principles than the senses can give. St. Paul's may be nothing but bricks and mortar and pieces of wood, each one of which has been shaped to suit the hands that have builded, nevertheless it is not a piece of mere handiwork ; it embodies ideals and hopes and imaginations; it holds principles of stresses and strains ; it is the gathering point for the outward manifestations of the religious life of a whole nation. None of these can be equated with nor derived from the activities of the builders in laying brick upon brick and tile upon tile ; yet it is through the bricks and the mortar and our relation to them that these larger principles and greater issues are made manifest. Where do these principles and issues come from, how do they penetrate into their material manifestation ?

The same thing is true with regard to events, of whatever kind they may be. They hold together in virtue of principles which the senses cannot supply, and move forwards impelled by a guidance and attracted by ideals which must have their source otherwhere than in our primitive animal endowment.

While there is this higher guidance nevertheless it does not supersede that given by the senses. Whatever larger issues are involved and whatever new groupings of events are called for, they all have to move within the limits which the senses set for them. Events are thus fastened to man's nature and cannot cut themselves loose from their moorings. But although events are fastened to man's nature, this, it may be argued, does not make them dependent upon man. What events do, or at least what some of them do, is to attach themselves for a moment, in their movement through reality, to man's life, and to proceed from this point further afield. Although they meet man nevertheless they are determined by principles and conditions which it is not in the power of man to fashion. Let us take, for instance, the evolutionary processes which make up the history of animate nature. In order to understand and explain the events forming these processes man

has to systematise them by means of logical principles of classification which are dependent upon the nature of his intelligence. But through this system, however close its dependence upon man may be, there runs an evolutionary process over which man has no control whatever and which he must accept as a hard and fast principle brought to him from an outside source. Man's mind has not controlled the biological process which, proceeding from small beginnings, has brought him into existence as its highest product. The further course of evolution man may guide, for he is now a moment in the process and his particular nature and his unique point of view will of necessity have their due influence and exert their own legitimate power upon all the events with which they come to be concerned. But the earlier stages of the process, in which man's mind had not come into being, must be outside the range of human influence. Obvious, however, as the above conclusions seem to be, they cannot be altogether justified. Undoubtedly events took place on the earth before man came or could come into existence, and these events produced results without the intervention of man. But both the results produced and the manner of their production are without form until the creative powers of mind

are brought to bear upon them. The grass may grow beneath the trees in some primeval forest, where man's foot has never trod, but the tree is nothing to the grass and the grass nothing to the tree ; each is to the other a characterless event. The birds will see the trees as a place to nest in, and the grass as a feeding place ; man sees both trees and grass as part of nature's scheme ; if there are beings higher than man, these will see them as something different still. Each type of mind, on its own level and with its own peculiar powers, gives form and character to events, commensurate with the creative energy it can bring to bear upon them. The same is true of the processes by means of which one event is made to follow from another. The evolutionary process is not one clear movement running through events and binding them together irrespective of man and his point of view. While every event composing this process and every result that follows from it, actually takes place, nevertheless they are all so embedded within the vast medley of events constituting mere actuality as to be without form, until man finds them and places them in their setting as moments in the process which, like the events, takes its character from his mind. In the same way as, when sitting in a rail-

way carriage, I can hammer out many tunes from the beat of the wheels as they run over the metals, so man with his many points of view can discover numberless processes running through the texture of reality. The evolutionary process, like all other ordered sequences knitting events together, is just a tune which man's mind beats out from the masses of detail that life flings up to him. But what of man himself? Is he not a result of the very process to which he is supposed to give form and character? Man, however, will not identify himself altogether with this surface life made up of events taking their place among other events in the stream of time. He insists that there is within him a life far deeper than this. Even as he pursues this deeper life, to find out exactly what it is, it betakes itself further and further into the dark recesses where he cannot follow. He tries to see it as an event, and to connect it with others in the sequence of events making up the evolutionary process; but it escapes all his efforts; it came not with the tide of events; it passes not away at their bidding; it proclaims that it was before they came into being and that it will be when they have ceased to ebb and flow.

If there are no eternal principles guiding the

course of events, what are we to understand by the truth of history? A guidance of events there certainly is; and this guidance, as we have insisted, is given at the hands of man; it begins with man and it ends with him. It is when present attitudes towards events are compared, by means of memory, with past attitudes, that we arrive at the historical survey of events. For instance, in the life of an individual, childhood, youth, and middle age have each their own fulness of ideas, hopes, and eventfulness; in each stage the physical conditions of the body, the circumstances into which persons at that stage are thrown, give the point of view from which the individual regards what happens to him and what takes place around him. As the years move onwards the individual feels these changes taking place in himself; through the fact of memory he comes to regard from his present point of view, not merely what, happens now, but what happened long ago and what was then regarded from other points of view now dissolved by time. The result is that the individual thinks of his present attitude and the events in his life which that attitude has to bring into some kind of order, as a progress, whereas it is really only a change. The same thing is true in all history, social, political, and even scientific.

Events move onwards never to occur again ; hopes and aspirations and points of view in respect of them also change in the same way ; but memory lingers at their point of departure and in lingering imagines that it holds the past and can carry it into the present and into the future. It is but a fond illusion, for memory itself, whether it is of individuals or of nations, is subject to the same sea-change. What we are ultimately left with is a stream of events held at various points in the mould of man's hopes and aspirations, with man himself and all his hopes changing and passing away and again renewing themselves ; and the purpose of it all just the living, pulsating present. There are here no vast threads binding and holding and keeping events so that they shall all be directed to some vast consummation which is the meaning of the universe and the hope of mankind. Neither philosophy nor scientific method have revealed such a consummation ; nor are they able to do so ; they can only analyse events in the light of the relative view points which man takes up at the various moments of life, and they themselves must change their method and their aim with these changing attitudes.

We have seen that philosophy cannot reveal truth residing in existence as a self-subsistent

whole, nor can it find any great objective guiding principles moving through events and constituting the truth of all that happens. It may be said, however, that truth centres in man himself and moves from him in such a way as to envelope existence and events which, although seemingly external, are nevertheless subordinate to him. Man is the arbiter of being and the ultimate guide of all movements that have any meaning at all; since his life possesses a fulness of character and a definiteness of principles so great that they can impress themselves upon a world, it is within that life that he must look to find the truth of reality. Man may not feel himself as a being possessing these great powers, nevertheless his activities in relation to reality presuppose their existence within him. Man, however, never comes into possession of these powers until he becomes creatively active. Unless man exercised this activity, these powers guiding reality as it reveals itself to man, would never be at all. It is not that they would lie dormant awaiting man's call to life, but that they would never have birth. As man becomes creatively active in relation to reality he also becomes creative in respect of his own being. He is not a finished product or a final and perfected spiritual being exercising powers

that are hard and fast in their character and ultimate in their significance. Were man this, then the powers by which he lives and through the exercise of which he is enabled to gain a revelation of reality, would be the measure of truth that is ultimate and final and which forms the foundation of all that is. It may be argued, however, that if truth is thus a growth developing with man's ever widening and deepening activities, every stage of that growth makes an advance towards a goal, a heaping up of spiritual treasure. What is thus gained is held and forms a solid foundation of truth that nothing can shake. Man need not possess truth whole and entire; it is sufficient if he holds what he can and moves onward to the ideal of perfect truth. Yet I would point out that the creative activity of man is creative only that it might be destructive also. It arises from a movement of decay and itself passes again into decay. The whole of man's emotional life, where it concerns his relations to his fellows, is rendered possible only by the fact that death is the goal of life. By sweeping the generations away death allows for new birth, new tendernesses, new fears, new trials, and new happinesses; in the knowledge that it faces all of us our lives are limited, made

coherent and definite. Were an artist told that he must paint his picture on a canvas infinite in extent he would stand helpless before an impossibility. It is only by limiting his canvas to a comparatively small compass that he can give expression and reality to the beauty upon which his soul has gazed. In the same way a life rich in emotional movement, pregnant with deep issues and steeped in definiteness and certainty of meaning, can only come to realisation within the limits marked out by birth and death. The poet who falls half in love with death and calls him soft names is in love with the grandeur of his own life, a grandeur which death alone makes possible. The same thing is true, although perhaps the limits are wider, of the life of the community. Civilisations come to birth, they grow and flourish only because they must also pass away. They increase in complexity, they call for a greater and greater number of principles which shall render this complexity and variety an ordered whole, until at last man finds his powers unequal to the task. Then like old men ripe in years and experience, but with fading powers and halting footsteps, they lose interest in the larger issues. Like old men, too, in this they hark back to the things of childhood, finding

their interests in cruder emotions and their welfare in the appreciation of that which has passed. Thus although the mind of man may be creative of the order that rules in life and the guidance moving through events, yet this order and guidance are both ephemeral; they are dependent upon powers that have but a transcient life and a passing value. If philosophy fails to find ultimate truth in existence, in the passing of events and in the life of man, what hope has religion of finding it? But religion does not seek truth where philosophy seeks it, neither does she understand by truth what philosophy understands by it.

We must distinguish between religion pure and simple and religion that has a large admixture of philosophic elements. Elaborations of religious doctrines are very largely philosophic both in character and in intention. Systems of Church Government and much that characterises formal worship are often political in character and rest upon philosophic foundations. Theories as to the nature of God, the form of His existence, the exact relation in which He stands to the world and to souls are determined through and through by the philosophic and scientific point of view of those who construct such theories.

For instance, if existence is position in the spatial and temporal series, as some philosophers assert, then to ask whether God exists is to ask if He can be placed at some point or other in this series. If again, existence is a character ascribed to qualitative content in virtue of its social significance, then the problem of the existence of God turns on the question as to whether He is part of the qualitative content of men's lives. Again, questions of Church organisation, of the seat of authority in matters of Church government, problems as to the distinction and value between priestly office and prophetical office, sacramental activity and teaching activity, while they have a certain value, and perhaps important value, are nevertheless relative to the social and political ideas and practices of the times. Take, for instance, the commission which all Churches give their ministers to preach and to teach, withholding such commission from the laity except under very stringent conditions. When the bulk of the people were illiterate and the only way of disseminating ideas was by convening men together in meeting houses and there talking to them, preaching and teaching could be confined to a chosen few and allowed only at certain places. But the spread of education, the power

of everyone to read and write, the huge mass of literature, pamphlets, papers, and so on, that are distributed, and the easy way in which people can be gathered together in meetings of all kinds, have cut away the ground from the claim of clergy and ministers to be the only preachers and teachers. Religious truth, therefore, must not be confused with religious doctrine and practice. Certainly both of these have valid claims to be considered true but their truth is that of speculation and of order—a truth determined by logic serving as the guide of life and by policy acting as the consolidator and conserver of the gains that life brings. The truth that religion seeks and holds lies much deeper than these. But let us hark back for a moment to the truth that is of time, of life, and of the world, for it may throw some light upon the problem that religion sets. This former kind of truth is really an attitude which a changing mind takes up towards a changing world, and moreover an attitude which itself changes continually. That is why contents, and principles, and structures going to the formation of a closely knit objective reality cannot hold or contain truth. Truth breaks through them, scattering their elements hither and thither so that it may gather them

together again and build them anew, just as a child tumbles down its house of bricks in order to have the satisfaction of making another one. Like secular truth, religious truth is an attitude of the soul; but it is an attitude whereby the soul strives to get beneath or beyond its changing nature into a depth of being which is abiding, and with which it can identify itself, saying, as it were, I am this which abides or which lies deep down beneath the possibility of change and decay. The road to this goal is the way of renunciation, self-abnegation and self-sacrifice, not merely in a moral sense but also, and perhaps far more so, in an intellectual sense. It is only when man realises that the scientific and philosophic constructions of reality, which he builds so carefully, are without significance in respect of the abiding foundations of his own soul life that the way of truth lies open. And the gain that religious truth brings to man is nothing tangible, nothing real in the ordinary sense of the term, nothing definite and clear which he can describe and regard as a concrete possession. And yet the assurance that truth gives is of such tremendous significance and raises the soul to such heights that profound calm, peace and trust are its fruits to man. Here it

is that a man has reached beyond pleasure and pain, beyond happiness and unhappiness, to the state of blessedness ; here it is that he has passed beyond time and reached into eternity, here it is that he has lost the world in order that he might gain heaven.

CHAPTER IV

GOODNESS

JUST as men make the mistake of supposing religion to be a matter of speculation and belief, classifying it as a simple kind of metaphysic open to the minds of all, so in the same way they wrongfully assign to it the purpose of making men good. Even where men are willing to concede that speculative knowledge, or the want of it, are not matters with which religion need concern itself, nevertheless they insist that both the knowledge and practice of goodness are to be expected from those who call themselves religious. Goodness they consider to be one of the fruits of the spirit, and indeed the most important; without it the other virtues associated with the religious life could not make their appearance, and the extent to which a man practises it is taken to be the measure of his sincerity in religious matters. Religion, therefore, must show men what goodness is and how it distin-

guishes itself from evil. Furthermore, it must discipline and guide men so that they can realise the good in their own lives and make their social institutions instruments to this end.

There are religions, however, which seemingly concern themselves very little with goodness; what such religions lay stress upon is ceremonial and a sacramental unity with God achieved through ritual. But ceremonial purity and sacramental unity are not without their influence upon everyday life. Baptismal regeneration, in washing away the taint of original sin, weakens man's natural bias towards wrongdoing and therefore makes it easier for him to live uprightly. The renewing of the baptismal vows at the time of confirmation, gives to him who makes the renewal the seven-fold gifts of wisdom and understanding, counsel and ghostly strength, knowledge and true godliness and the spirit of holy fear. The greater number of these gifts are designed to lead men towards goodness. Again, sacramental confession and the Eucharist are meant to give men strength and wisdom to face the concrete issues of life. The difference between the varying religious attitudes which may be taken towards goodness is that some men regard goodness as a gift whereas others hold it to be an

achievement. Those who take up the former view say that if man will first find God then God will give to him the power to realise goodness in his own life and circumstances ; those who hold the latter view insist that man must find goodness and practise it before he can hope to find God.

No man, however, can find his way through the complicated issues of life unless knowledge illumines his path at every step, and knowledge is only to be obtained as the result of a long and arduous process. Gift of God though it may have been, man's innocence was not of any real value because it lacked the knowledge that alone could make it the outcome of man's free activity ; therefore it was that man ate of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. God may pour out His spirit upon all flesh so that the sons and daughters of men may prophesy, their old men dream dreams and their young men see visions, but nevertheless the prophesy and the vision are not revelations of an ordered world that ought to be and of a goodness that is existential and living in virtue of its hold upon the detail of life. Such knowledge man has to find for himself ; the power to gain it may be the gift of God, but the actual gaining must be the work of man, a work carried out in bitterness

and tears, in the sweat of his brow and through sorrow and death. The problem of good and evil is thus one that life itself has to solve, and if religion would know the solution she must ask it of life. And this is what she really does. Wherever religion puts forth a doctrine of good and evil that doctrine is traceable to some particular philosophical criticism of life. Good and evil thus become filled with a content drawn from the world of fact and events manifesting themselves in man's experience. Furthermore, in order to make good and evil concrete, religion follows the philosophic method of seeking to discover universal principles and particularising them by bringing them into relation with the detail of life. The ten commandments were, and are still considered in many circles, as a body of universal principles of this kind. Their ultimate character, however, is removed from the sphere of philosophical enquiry by the contention that they proceed from the will of God. It is thought, no doubt, that their origin in the Divine Will gives to them a religious significance they would not otherwise possess. Criticism, however, has gone to show that they are not as universal and ultimate as may have been supposed. Some of them are bound up with the particular form of social

structure that is recognised as the most beneficial to man ; others, again, such as that deprecating coveteousness, are preventive measures against larger evils ; he who covets his neighbour's house or wife or possessions is likely to commit greater sins in order to gain that which he covets. They are all derived therefore from the same data and by means of the same philosophic method as are any other principles giving unity and meaning to life. All such principles presuppose definite circumstances and conditions within which they can move, and they only become concrete, and therefore real, by drawing to themselves a fulness of character derived from the particular nature of these circumstances. If therefore a law is universally binding and ultimate then the conditions and circumstances which give it validity must have the force of the ultimate ought belonging to the law itself. For instance, if the commandment—Thou shalt not steal—is final and ultimate then the conditions that allow of stealing, such as the right of private property, must be equally final and ultimate.

It may be said that this point of view gives to the temporal affairs and circumstances of life a significance which they manifestly do not possess. Principles abide, and in virtue of this

characteristic they are able to give unity and meaning to changing detail and circumstances. Were it the case that circumstances could become ultimate they would lose their power of change, and losing this, the world itself would become static and dead. The mistake, however, really lies in making principles ultimate and final. They are not so, for being bound up with changing circumstances they themselves are within the range and subject to the disintegrating effects of change. It is only by harbouring within themselves fulness of character and the change which that fulness always carries with it, that principles are able to deal with the detail of life. The philosopher may assert that there is one principle defining what is ultimately good and that this principle remains constant. He explains the fact that the good assumes many different forms in different circumstances and times by saying that one common good can run through, manifest itself in, or become particularised in a great number of differentiations due to differing conditions. What I want to point out, however, is that no mere principle can give expression to the good. The further a principle is removed from particulars the less able is it to tell us what the good is, and consequently the less

true it is. Every such principle stands for, not something definite, concrete and characterful, but a mere possibility along a certain vague direction. Not until the direction becomes more or less clearly defined and the possibility more or less adequately realised, through the addition of a multiplicity of circumstances and conditions, does the principles even begin to give expression to anything of the character which we assign to it. For instance, if we say that the highest good is the welfare of the state, this merely sets forth the possibility of men gathering together to form associations of governors and governed. Such a possibility no doubt lies at the root of all social activity and is therefore the basis of our life as rational human beings. But such a possibility is neither good nor evil; it is simply a fundamental fact of life. Not until it is connected with other facts in a concrete setting does it begin to take on form and character. When this happens, however, it is not that a principle has created goodness by being applied to certain circumstances, but rather that circumstances themselves have given rise to a definite principle. They have shaped and formed themselves into a concrete whole which is recognised as good, and it is they which are both creative and constitu-

tive of the good. What we have said above is on a parallel with what we have said concerning the fundamental principles which give expression to the structure of existence. For science, existence is in the last resort an infinity of atoms or electrons active according to certain mathematical formulæ. But this is really nothing more than one point of view which we can take up in regard to existence. To come upon existence as real, and to know what it is, we must combine this point of view or this possibility of acting in relation to it with many other points of view. We must bring to bear upon it not only our powers of counting, but our powers of seeing colours, hearing sounds, handling, touching, lifting, and so on, together with endless particularisations of these powers. Not until we have done this will existence become anything real to us or for us. The same is true of moral principles. It is the setting of life and the fulness derived from the content of life and experience that give them their reality and their validity. No principle, therefore, can lay claim to being final; certainly there will always be a highest principle in reference to which life finds its fullest meaning for the time being; but new life calls for new meanings, and what was once

the highest may find its place taken by some other principle.

Besides failing to justify anything but a relative character as belonging to the good, philosophy fails to root the good in that which is above and beyond man himself. The problem as to whether there is goodness in the universe, irrespective of man and of man's point of view, has always been and always will be a vexatious one in a philosophical speculation. On the one hand it is held that deep down at the heart of things there is an infinite goodness which man can recognise if he will; on the other hand it is often asserted that the only good is the good will. These rival solutions make very great differences in men's lives and in the institutions which men build up as the instruments towards the realisation of goodness. A man who believes that there is an infinite goodness at the heart of the world will act very differently from one who believes that the world is wholly indifferent to the good. A man who holds that each person, in virtue of his personality, possesses an ultimate value, will not see eye to eye in his social relationships with one who denies such value to persons. Whole civilisations and systems of government differ very widely according as those who build

them believe that material welfare is good or evil. Western civilisation is built up on the theory that material welfare is one of the greatest goods; much of the civilisation of the east is built up on the idea that it is in the inner life of contemplation and quiet and freedom from all but the primal necessities of life, that the greatest good is to be found. When such civilisations meet they clash, and who or what is to decide between them?

Can religion borrow from philosophy on these terms, and will the conception of the good as relative and even problematic satisfy the demands she makes upon it? In contrast to philosophic speculation, religion asserts that unless a man's life is set in one direction he is lost. Everything that takes him away from this path of salvation is evil; everything that keeps him along it is good. It is because she must insist upon the unconditional character of the life she holds before men and the utter destructiveness of its opposite, that religion has been and will remain fanatical and unreasonable. When religion allows herself to become reasonable she forsakes the high road of the unconditional and becomes a mere philosophy of life. While by this means she may guide men in accordance with the highest

ideals and the most profound thought of the times, nevertheless she cannot give to them the assurance of a life that is untouched by the vicissitudes of time and the changes of the world.

In addition to pointing out one way of life as the good, to depart from which is death, and over which reason cannot claim control, religion tends to regard the good of this world, after which man strives, as being of very little value. The good of religion only becomes real by being cut away from life and all its details. ' Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." " And everyone that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall inherit everlasting life." Again, St. Paul says :—" Who shall separate us from the love of Christ ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword ? . . . . For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creation, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." Again Christ tells us

that none is good save God alone. Good therefore is not something belonging to the world nor to anything in the world, that man should cleave to it. There are things belonging to God and things belonging to Cæsar, the one set being transient and evanescent, the other being abiding and eternal. On earth there may be marriages and marriage tangles, but in God's kingdom there is neither marriage nor giving in marriage. Food to eat and raiment to put on may be necessities of life, but God's righteousness comes first and all other things are mere additions to this. This is why Christ makes goodness consist of two great attitudes which are to be taken up by men, namely an attitude to God and an attitude towards others, each of whom is considered as a child of God. Goodness as an end is thus transferred from the actual content of life to the only abiding realities that are above and beyond life. It becomes an inward attitude of the soul, an attitude which turns away altogether from the outward things making up this world of ours. Thus good and evil in the religious sense of these terms are not universals which have to be particularised, they are something entirely different.

Since good consists in the enfolding of a man's life by the Divine life and involves a valuation

of the world and time as being of no importance beside this one great end, does it not make life impossible? There are aspects of religious life in which all mingling with the world and its affairs is considered to be sinful. Some eastern religions insist upon a contemplation that cuts its votaries altogether away from life. They describe such a cutting away from life as being the state of blessedness and the world and life as being inherently evil. The theory that all men are born in sin because concupisence is of the nature of sin is also a reflection of this view. If men really believed these things would not the best thing be to die and leave the world a humanless wilderness? An examination of the conception of sin may throw a good deal of light upon this problem. If sin is the opposite of good then it may be possible for us to know what good is, from the implications of sin, its opposite. Sin consists of a wrong attitude towards the things and circumstances that are here and now. It is an attitude, however, taken up in virtue of enmity against God, and this makes it altogether different from wrong doing or from evil in the philosophical sense of the term. The good of mankind, as science, philosophy and history understand it, consists in the essential

harmony between man and the conditions and circumstances of his life. Wrong doing is that which tends to hinder or destroy this harmony. It may proceed from different causes, and more often than not it is the result of mere ignorance. But wrong doing is not sin ; it only becomes this when it is carried out deliberately with the intention of dragging men down from their communion with God. Man had not known sin but for the law ; and the knowledge of the law revealed sin to man because the law was the expressed will of God. Just as sin, which is enmity against God, realises itself externally and objectively in wrong attitudes towards life, so good, which is communion with God, may find a certain fruition in contemplating life as proceeding from God's hand. Thus man is good and finds good in life and in the world only when he acts from love towards God. Not because life is a harmony, not because it fulfils any definite purposes is it good. It is good when it is seen through the life and through the mind which is one's own and which is at the same time God's life also. It is evil when God's personality is removed and we have to view it in the light of our own thin, circumscribed and meaningless self-hood. Just as one's surround-

ings, no matter what they may be, seem and are dull, uninteresting and despair provoking, when lived in during loneliness, and again become pleasant and happy places when those whom we love are present with us, so in the same way life becomes good or evil according as the Divine life is absent from us or pours itself into our life, constituting itself a medium through which we gaze out upon the things around us. The inpouring of the Divine life into ours has not altered the world in which we live, it has not reshuffled our circumstances, nor again has it revealed to us elements in them of which we knew nothing before, in the way in which a light thrown upon things shows to us the detail in the shadows. What it has done is to give us joy and happiness in circumstances and under conditions where previously we could find no happiness. The nature of the circumstances is quite immaterial; however far removed they may be from what men regard as necessary for comfort and material well-being, they can and do become hallowed by the presence of God to those who dwell under them; even pain, may become a source of joy for there are those who are "Glad with Him to suffer pain."

The philosopher will say that all this is due

to a change in men's minds, a change moreover which can be analysed and traced to definite causes. But while philosophy or psychology may tell us how every action and every thought of man proceeds from his mind as fashioned by circumstances, education, memory, desires, purposes, and so on, it cannot get behind these to that setting of a man's life whereby the man himself clings to God or shrinks from Him. A man feels his life as flowing into God's life or ebbing away from it. It is this flow of his life that is fundamental, unanalysable, and which forms the basis of his whole being considered in terms of eternity. Such terms as 'God beloved' and 'God abandoned' give perhaps what is a crude expression to these attitudes. The same thing is experienced when we come into contact with those whose lives are saintly. It is not altogether a matter of right-doing. For instance, St. Bernard must have been a clear sighted, able and shrewd man of affairs, one who could lay bare the moral issues of his times and guide both his life and the lives of others through them. St. Francis, on the other hand, was one to whom the affairs of life were matters of the greatest confusion, and consequently things to be left entirely on one side. Nevertheless the lives of both men were

set Godward and the influences that proceeded from those lives were truly characterised as saintly. Neither philosophy nor psychology, which deal with life and its detail and the way in which man's nature is competent to deal with life, can tell us how the sinner can become saint, how God's grace moves in the heart of men and binds them to itself. Whenever philosophy has tried to deal with these questions it has turned into the barren controversy concerning the possession by man of ultimate free will. From the religious point of view the controversy is futile and its terms meaningless.

Thus the good and evil of religion are not the good and evil of philosophy ; the latter is relative to life as here and now and as a passing away ; the former is the abiding attitude of the soul as eternal and as related to its God.

CHAPTER V

BEAUTY

RELIGION, it is often said, should not merely reveal truth to men and inculcate goodness, but should also express itself in terms of beauty, for the beautiful is one way in which spiritual values can find realisation in life, and therefore a path along which man can wend his way to God.

Along with goodness and truth beauty is considered a moment of the Divine life ; it proceeds from God, suffuses itself over the world, penetrates from the world into the mind of man and thereby becomes a medium through which God and man can meet. Beauty is thus made to possess a perfection in its own right, merely manifesting itself in more or less imperfect and inadequate ways in this world of ours. It is as though men break in upon the serenity and calm of a heavenly realm of being, in order to carry away fragments for the feeding of

their souls compelled to sojourn in this world of time. At some remote period Prometheus may have stolen from heaven the fire of knowledge to light men's paths here below, but in every present through which men live they seek to catch glimpses of the heavenly beauty to give them visions of the things that shall be. Is it a matter for wonder therefore that men should ask of religion that it pour beauty into their souls?

Men, however, are mistaken in fancying there is a realm of beauty beyond the things of time. Beauty *is* only as it realises itself in the particular things that are beautiful. True, we draw a distinction between a thing and its beauty and are led to believe that the one can be separate from the other. Such an attitude is seemingly justified. The thing itself could just as well exist in another shape or form without being beautiful; the conditions which make it a thing are not necessarily those which make it also beautiful. For instance, that which makes a Greek vase a thing is the material, with its weight, hardness, colour, and so on; that which makes it beautiful is the way in which it is shaped, the disposition of colour masses, the texture that is given to the material, and

the harmony which shape, colour, and texture are made to assume. Thus the thing itself is seemingly the meeting point of very different sets of conditions, some of which make for its existence and others of which make for its beauty. In consequence of this the attempt is naturally made to trace these different conditions to different sources. When this attempt is made we arrive at a realm of existence on the one hand and a realm of beauty on the other hand, both of which become in some way connected with each other.

I would point out, however, that the conditions making for beauty are fundamentally the same in kind as those making for existence. For instance, bulk or mass, which is one of the most important factors of material existence, is a content of mind giving expression to certain forms of activity such as resistance; shape again, which is the form taken by mass, and consequently an important constituent of existence, is a content of mind giving expression to bodily movements. Mass exists only as it manifests itself in our experience, and it can only manifest itself there by calling forth the activity or a memory of the activity of pushing, pulling, etc. Shape exists only as it manifests itself in experience, and in our experience it is created in

the activities of bodily movement ; the eye moves from point to point, or the hands pick out the surface and limits of that which they find as shape. In the same way forms of beauty are all contents of mind giving expression to certain activities on our part. These activities are in many cases simple and in other cases very complex, but in all cases the beautiful form is nothing more than the expression or manifestation in the object of that which our activity puts into it. In dreams we imagine ourselves active in pushing, pulling, lifting, and so on, and thereby receive the impression that we are handling heavy objects ; so in life, we act in various ways in relation to objects and thereby get the impression of beautiful or ugly forms. Just as there is no transcendent quality of existence imposing itself upon things and giving to them their existence, so there is no transcendent quality of beauty coming down from some far away realm to impregnate with its living power the things of earth. Since beauty is born in man's attitude towards whatever enters into his experience and is a quality inherent in things in virtue of the fact that they are part of his life, everything used by man, even in the most ordinary affairs of life, ought to possess as much beauty as possible. There

is no excuse for allowing even the meanest of man's possessions and the humblest of his circumstances to be ugly and sordid.

It may be said that beauty lives in our appreciation and can serve no end and fulfil no purpose beyond this. Appreciation is not activity: it comes into play at odd moments when a person has relaxed his activity and has ceased for the time being to be creative in respect of life and circumstances. Beauty as living in appreciation, therefore, is something added to things over and above those qualities which make them part of the settled scheme of things facing man and calling forth all his energies. For instance, the house we live in serves its purpose in covering us, by being made of four walls and a roof; the beauty which we give it by disposing the walls in a certain fashion, making the roof a certain shape and giving to the whole its own peculiar decorative effect, is considered as something added to the mere fact of use. Appreciation, however, is indissolubly connected with activity; an appreciative attitude is the mind's expectancy of becoming active so as to realise the purposes it sets before itself. It is merely appreciative when the mind rests in expectancy, allowing imagination to usurp the place of action, and contempla-

tion of what might be to take the place of efforts after the realisation of what ought to be. This is why there is always something about mere appreciation that is unreal and expressive of decadence rather than strength. For instance, in religious worship, overmuch ritual and elaboration are enervating and unmanly, and are rightly associated with weakness rather than strength. Again, churches as far as immediate use is concerned, are merely places where the faithful can gather together for common praise and worship. It may be thought and no doubt it is thought, that they can serve their purpose equally well no matter what beauty or even what ugliness is given to them. But this is a very grave mistake. The architectural beauty that belongs to them is derived from ideals representing active participation in life. Where these ideals are lacking the architecture is of a very poor quality. What is more important still is that worship and doctrine are on a par with the ugliness of the building. It was during the eleventh and twelfth centuries that churches began to be built in great abundance. The beauty that was given to them in Norman arches and solid proportions was expressive of Roman power, Roman measure, and Roman justice. Both worship and doctrine

took much of their form and content from these qualities and ideals, and on account of this the outward manifestation of worship, in beauty of architecture, could not but be influenced by them. In many places built for public worship nowadays the builders, while striving for beauty, have only achieved ugliness. A little Bethel, standing with white-washed walls on the hillside, possesses its own simple beauty in that it is expressive of a simple faith carried out on simple lines and representing a simple form of everyday life. But chapels in towns are usually abominations from the point of view of beauty. One often wonders what could have possessed those who designed them and those who built them. The reason for this want of beauty is, that while the buildings are intended to be expressive of a revolt from the ideals and points of view of other religious bodies, that revolt remained to a large extent negative. It never gripped hold of great constructive ideas or principles which would enable it to gain fulness and concreteness of faith and worship. When a religion of this kind comes into contact with the richer life of the towns and cities it seeks to make use of its added wealth, in its worship and in its buildings. But it can only do so in the way of unmeaning decorative

effects. What one sees is the attempt to find beauty in mere forms added one to another and all involving or expressing no definite direction of vital human activity. The result is ugliness. Using the term in its widest sense we see how impossible it is to divorce use from beauty, appreciation from vital activity.

It may be replied here that although human purposes and human activities must always be the subject matter of artistic creation, nevertheless it is not the ideals to which a piece of art gives expression that constitute its beauty. It is rather the way in which the material is shaped and formed that renders it ugly or beautiful. For instance, a man may set out with brush and canvas to paint a picture that shall glow with the most inspiring of ideals, but unless he can realise harmony of colour, beauty of line, balance and proportion in composition, his work will be hopeless. These, it may be said, are the elements of pure beauty, which are put to the service of the ideal. The same may be said of poetry. Words possess their own characteristic music, and combinations of words may be considered as ugly or beautiful without reference to the meaning which they convey. It is this music of words that makes beautiful poetry; ideals are altogether secondary to this.

I would answer this objection by maintaining that every constituent element of beauty is an expression of activity in terms of the particular character of human nature and the circumstances in which it finds itself. This can be illustrated very clearly in the case of painting. The model from which artists first gain their conceptions of the beautiful is the human figure. No artist's education can be said to have commenced until he has made a thorough study of the possibilities of line and modelling that the human form reveals. After he has studied this the artist proceeds with the study of beauty as it manifests itself in nature. This does not mean that because the body is human it must therefore be beautiful. It is beautiful when every line of it suggests the possibility of efficient activity in realising the demands which the particular nature of human life makes upon bodily structure. Small undeveloped limbs, combined with an overdeveloped and heavy body, are ugly because they give the suggestion of want of power. Artists, I have been told, find difficulty in painting portraits of young persons who have just passed beyond the stage of youth. The earlier period of life gives the painter opportunities of portraying a great range of possible virtues, that is, activities which

men recognise as being most consistent with what the particular nature of human life demands. Such are innocence, freshness, keen interest in life, and so on. In the age beyond youth these virtues have not yet realised themselves so as to take definite direction in relation to the concrete detail and affairs of life. Not until later do a person's varied attitudes and activities manifest themselves in the lines, contours and expressions of his face. In consequence of this, it is not until this later stage is reached, that the artist can find in the face the possibilities that will give him scope for the expression of what we may call depth of beauty. Thus we see how the canons of beauty in respect of line and form are derived from a study of the human figure, and are expressive of the adaptibility of form to the purposes which the body fulfils in relation to human life.

It may be said, however, that there is beauty of line and form in nature irrespective of any interpretation of nature in terms of our human life. For instance, a line of hills or the curve of a river or the bend of a bay has each its own distinctive beauty. But I would point out that nature possesses no beauty until it finds representation in pictorial form. Nature as a whole

possesses neither beauty nor ugliness; it simply is and that is the most that can be said of it. Portions of it are selected, and the selection is always made on the basis of a manifestation that can be represented pictorially. No man would ever see beauty in nature unless he had learnt to draw or at the least to appreciate drawing. The canons of beauty which are brought to bear upon nature itself are derived from line and figure as they appear in drawing. We speak of lines as being soft or hard, sweeping and simple, flat or giving the impression of relief, and we judge the technical qualities of line by reference to these canons. Now every one of these canons is the expression of an attitude which we can take up in reference to what is around us; an attitude, not of artistic appreciation, but of vital bodily activity. This it is that brings it about that all beauty in nature is at bottom the beauty of the human form.

An analysis of the other elements of beauty such as composition, proportion, balance, and so on, will reveal the same underlying principles. It requires very little reflection to see that no work of art can lay claim to beauty unless it can stand out clearly as a whole, giving expression to a situation that can be grasped and under-

stood in one sweep of a man's intelligence. For instance, a crowded canvas that disperses a man's attention by representing now one point of view, now another, and fails to bring competing and conflicting points of view rapidly into one harmonious impression, cannot but be unsuccessful. Again, the medium through which any artistic creation is effected has a very marked influence upon the type of beauty that can be bodied forth by that creation. The reason for this is that each kind of medium approximates in its nature to certain well marked characteristics and possibilities of activity on our part. For instance, water colours are thin, slight, and lacking in permanency. They are best used therefore for producing pleasing effects and representing phases of life that call forth quiet and transcient emotions. The same is true of wood, where an artist produces carved wood figures. Breadth of treatment, the representation of grand impressions worked out through a mass of detail and calling forth powerful emotions, are only possible in oils and in marble. Both of these media admit of this treatment because they themselves are of the quality which, when present in the circumstances and affairs of life, calls forth these reactions on our part. Man fighting nature, being crushed

by it or being triumphant over it; finding the struggle hard, wearying and yet formative of his whole being; or man struggling with, shaping, moulding and building a social structure that he can hand down from generation to generation, can only represent his struggles and triumphs and the ideals which have inspired them, through a medium which offers to him the same resistance and harbours the same kind of possibilities as the circumstances of life which have necessitated these struggles.

I have tried to show that the values which beauty reveals are not from some rarer realm or higher sphere. On the contrary, they manifest themselves and come to realisation in man's ordinary activities in relation to his surroundings, activities which are necessitated by his particular needs and directed by his particular nature and the nature of the circumstances in which he finds himself. Are these values making up the nature of beauty of primary importance to religion and a necessary element in the religious life? Art has played such a vital part in religious worship that its importance to religion cannot be lightly set aside.

There are two points of view from which the significance of art for religion can be estimated.

In the first place, the significance may be what we call sacramental, whereas in the second place it may be merely a matter of expediency, that is to say nothing more than an aid to worship, just as four walls and a roof are an aid in that they enable people to assemble themselves together. According to the sacramental view beauty becomes the "beauty of holiness" when what is beautiful bodies forth certain aspects of the Divine life and of God's relation to man. The deeper and more adequate the representation, the greater the beauty that is called forth. But further than this, the representation itself partakes in, and therefore brings down to those who are present at it and who enter into its spirit, the actual nature and being of that which it represents. Christ made the bread broken and the wine outpoured the sign and symbol of His body sacrificed and His blood shed, and from that time forward the sacramental bread and wine were looked upon as containing in some mystical way the actual life of Christ, so that the offering of it up became on every occasion a re-enactment of the drama that took place on Calvary. Ceremonial robes, lights, genuflections and all the magnificent appurtenances of worship have each their own symbolism, and serve to make real that which is signified

thereby. Through such ceremonial the higher life is mediated and brought down, not merely in representation but also in actuality, to those who take part in the ceremonial. Solemnity and awe are called forth by august ritual because in such ritual the Divine presence becomes actualised. To one who shuts himself out from that presence high ceremonial may appear as childish or even idolatrous. That many people find it unprepossessing and garish is undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, to those who are convinced of what they call its sacramental character it becomes a thing of Divine beauty. It is not merely representative or symbolic of man's activity in relation to God and of God's activity in relation to man, but it is also a medium in and through which both of these activities realise themselves. It fulfils therefore all the requirements which art demands of that which claims to be beautiful, and it fulfils them in the highest degree. Worship so conceived and so carried out thus becomes a thing of mystic beauty.

I must insist upon the profound truth that worship does reveal, in a mystic way, the personal presence of God to the worshippers. Worship is not a mere assembling of ourselves together as a matter of convenient hearing. It is much

more than this. If it were not so, then under modern conditions and circumstances of life it would very soon lose its *raison d'etre*. There are many ways in which people can be and are better taught than from the pulpit. Nor can one say that worship is a social rather than an individual approach to God. Social groups are built up on certain well-marked principles, and these principles stand for quite definite purposes which the different constitutions of the various social groups are intended to realise. Each social group has thus its own constitutional lines and its own constructional character. Worship, however, is not intended to be a social grouping after this manner. Undoubtedly it is largely organised in accordance with social principles. The forms of worship of different religious denominations manifest the social and political points of view of their adherents; some are democratic in character, others aristocratic, others autocratic. While these various points of view have their value in bringing people together for the purpose of worship, nevertheless this value is entirely subsidiary, and in no way affects the definitely religious aspect of worship. If religious bodies would learn that the social implications of their form of worship are very secondary and unimportant compared

with the spirit of worship, there would be much less of the narrow dogmatism that embitters a great deal of religion. It is this spirit of worship that brings down to men the Divine presence. Just as the individual, by directing his whole being Godward, creates for himself, in that activity, an intensity of life that is infinitely greater than and altogether removed from his merely natural life, so in the same way men are able to bind themselves together, in the activity of worship, into a unity of soul-life that is felt to be one life in the presence of God. From this life all the distinctive characteristics that make for unity of social life are absent. No principles of social construction could hold individuals together in this way, for each individual becomes merely a point through which can pulsate the infinitely higher life that is lived for the time being in God.

The question that presents itself at this point is this:—Is this Divine presence vouchsafed to men along the channels of those symbols which are supposed to indicate its presence? That is to say, do these symbols, by partaking in the nature of that which they signify, carry that nature with them so that when men act in relation to the symbols they are thereby acting in relation to what the symbols stand for? If this is so then

the beauty of worship becomes sacramental in the most definite sense. There are, however, certain fatal objections to this view. In the first place, symbols do not, except in a very vague and indirect way, partake of the nature of that which they signify. For instance, if I sit in the evening before the fire and see in the fire the faces of my absent friends, it does not mean that somehow or another those absent friends have thrown their natures into that fire in order to communicate with me ; or if I twist my empty cup at the tea table and find all manner of signs indicating what is going to happen in the future, this cannot be taken to mean that future events run the round of the teacup. To argue in this way may seem irreverent, but I cannot think it any more irreverent than to hold that the ceremonial of worship possesses a mystic power of uniting man with God. Take, for instance, the ceremonial of baptism. It is a fact of salvation only when it is the first step in a process whereby the Church takes the child in order to guide it continually, until it comes to years of discretion, in the way of holiness. It is this continual influence that the Church exercises upon the child that makes for the salvation of the child's soul, and the ceremony of baptism is merely a sign to all that

the Church undertakes this great responsibility. It is when symbols are thought of as having miraculous powers that we get religious superstitions, such as that which declares that the devil fears holy water or that by making the sign of the cross men can circumvent the influence of evil spirits. In the second place, no amount of symbolism will ever place men in communion with God unless those men are intent upon approaching Him in an attitude of deep humility. It is this intention and attitude that are the important matters, and without the aid of any symbolism or ceremonial men can achieve that which they set out to achieve. Beauty therefore cannot be said to possess the sacramental value with which high ceremonial invests it.

Nevertheless, it may be urged that beauty has a primary place in religious worship in that it sets a man's soul in a higher realm; it gives to the soul a direction that is turned away from the merely earthly and temporal, and consequently prepares it for entering into the higher life that is lived in God. I would contend, however, that beauty keeps man closer to this life and that its whole value consists in the fact that it enables him to make this life his own to a far greater degree than would otherwise be possible. Further-

more, in doing this it has a tendency, with some natures at all events, of shutting out the larger vision of God. In the first place, beauty is always sensuous. Colour, shape and sound, because they are the basis of existence, call forth of necessity man's interest whenever they appear. It is not merely that if man will represent life he must always represent it in terms of that which is its fundamental condition ; the sensuous basis of all that is, because it lies at the root of things, is a matter of supreme interest to him. Sounds and sights to which a man is unaccustomed at once call forth his attention ; likewise those which intrude themselves above the ordinary sensuousness to which he has as it were attuned his easy running perception. Any sensuous mass that can hold a person's interest or attention gives to that person's mind a feeling tone, in that it impels his consciousness to remain in it and to become active for the time being in relation to it. Feeling is just this tension of the mind which, in the presence of that which appeals to it, seeks to call into play a greater wealth of activity and a larger fulness of creative power. A great poem or a great picture always challenges one's vision and one's insight ; nevertheless the vision is kept close to earth, being held fast by the bonds of sense.

In the second place, beauty cannot call forth in the imagination anything beyond those activities which we are wont to use in dealing with the affairs and situations of everyday life. A quiet landscape will infuse into one's mind thoughts of peace and quiet, and give one an added patience and courage to meet the issues that life sets. Art is greatest where the sensuous matter is so moulded in the representation of some situation that the mind passes easily and almost unconsciously into the higher moods of which it is capable. Here it is that matter is so infused by form that one cannot distinguish where matter ends and form begins. Here it is that meaning loses its definiteness to become etherealised in such a way that it penetrates to every corner of the mind, giving one a new power with which to subdue life and subordinate it to one's purposes.

Do these creative activities of mind, which give to beauty its richness, its fulness, and its uniqueness of character, constituting thereby its essential nature, knit man closer to God? Are they the paths along which man seeks God and eventually finds Him? That they raise man above life by giving him the inspiration and the power to conquer it and to make it his own is undoubted; but are they able to lift him into

the realm of the eternal and so shape and form his soul that it becomes impervious to the destructive force of time and death? Hope, patience, courage, the desire for intenser activity, which are attitudes of mind called forth by artistic creation and appreciation, are always definitely directed to ends that man can understand, grasp, and make his own. Patience and courage may enable a man to overcome difficulties which prevent him from carrying out some schemes upon which he has set his heart, but are they of any avail where man's relation to God is concerned? Is it not rather the case that man seeks God and finds Him, not through the patience which solves a moral problem, or secures a worldly gain, or unravels an intellectual enigma; not through the courage that gives him power to meet situations which he knows may overwhelm him; not through the hope that his wishes and desires may find fulfilment in a problematical future; but rather in a spirit of awe inspiring humility from which all the moods and all the powers of mind enabling a man to face and conquer the world are absent? Were it the case that the virtues and the attitudes of mind which raise a man above the world and make him its master, which lift him above circumstances so that he can mould them as he

wishes, are the means whereby man finds God, then for the weakling and the broken and the despairing the gates of God's heaven must be for ever shut. Religion does not ask that man shall make his way towards a worldly perfection in order that he may find favour in the eyes of God; she promises that they who seek God in the spirit that is not of the world shall be granted a perfection of which the world knows nothing. If the beauty that life reveals is the manifestation of man's power, and if when man sets his face Godward this power over life becomes of no importance or of no value in reference to the things of the spirit, then beauty must likewise be a matter of indifference as far as depth of spiritual life is concerned. The cult of beauty cannot also be the cult of God, as so many would have us believe. Not that beauty need not have a place, perhaps a large place, in religious worship. If one must worship in buildings it is better that they should be beautiful than ugly; if one asks for ceremonial and ritual then it is better that they should be dignified and graceful rather than the reverse. But whatever beauty is imparted into the outward circumstances of worship, that beauty is not of the essential spirit of worship; it is a concession to the world; a reminder that

while we would break ourselves away entirely from the things of time we are nevertheless still tied to them; we cannot altogether move away from them even in our moments of communion with God. Since the world and time and the circumstances and conditions tying us down to the world intrude of necessity into worship, then it is better that beauty rather than ugliness should mark the intrusion. But we must make it quite clear to ourselves that this beauty is of very secondary importance; it is not of the essence of the life lived in God, for the ineffable character of that life is beyond the power of man to express.

I have tried in the preceding pages to cut away religion from the bonds of scientific and philosophic speculation. The psychological approach to religion and the psychological analysis of man's soul are impossible attitudes. They presuppose the view, that the means by which man makes himself at home in the world and under conditions manifestly meant to be passing and ephemeral, are also the means whereby he transcends the world and time to become entirely independent of them. Nor can I think of God as the perfection of the Good, the True and the Beautiful. These may be great ideals, but their whole character consists of a fulness and con-

creteness of essential nature and an infinitude of detail, drawn from the world of existence. Were the sensuous, the fleeting, the contradictions, the harmonies, and all the vast interplay of temporal circumstances to be swept away, the Good, the True and the Beautiful would vanish away with them. But death is that which sweeps these away from before men. If men would rest their souls in the abiding and the eternal then must they seek for them beyond death, and not this side of it ; if they would find a God whom death cannot touch and Who can give to them the same power over death which He possesses, then they cannot seek Him as the perfection of the Good, the True and the Beautiful. What God is man knows not ; what religion is by means of which man binds himself to God man cannot explain ; but of this he is sure, that he can sink his life in God's life and having done so await in peace the passing away of time, sure that when it has passed away it will leave him with his God.

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